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Africa  must  continue  to  be  active  in  international  trade  negotiations  as  it  is  being 
squeezed.  Policy  changes  in  its  markets,  dubbed  incorrectly  as  ‘liberalisation’  by 
proponents is eroding rapidly the competitive advantage conferred on traditional exports 
to long standing markets without offering new openings for novel products or markets. 
This  paper  analyses  the  nature  of  relevant  changes  in  the  World  Trade  Organization 
(WTO) and the bilateral policies of the Quad (Canada, the EU, Japan and the USA). 
Among the latter it gives special attention to the Economic Partnership Agreements that 
sub-Saharan Africa needs to negotiate with the EU and to changes in Europe’s Common 




L'Afrique  doit  continuer  activement  ses  négociations  commerciales  internationales 
malgré les pressions exercées sur elle. Les changements de politiques sur ses marchés, 
incorrectement étiquetés de "libéralisation" par leurs promoteurs, érodent rapidement les 
avantages compétitifs acquis depuis longtemps par les exportations traditionnelles sur les 
marchés, sans pour autant promouvoir de nouveaux produits ni créer d’ouvertures vers de 
nouveaux marchés. Cet article analyse la nature des changements intervenus au sein de 
l'Organisation  mondiale  du  commerce  (OMC)  et  les  politiques  bilatérales  du  Quad 
(Canada, UE, Japon et E.U.). Il se penche notamment sur les Accords de Partenariat 
Economique que l'Afrique subsaharienne doit négocier avec l'UE et les modifications de 
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Section 1: Introduction 
 
Africa’s trade negotiators have ‘punched above their weight’ in recent years, and they 
have needed to do so as patterns of trade are changing fast. Change is under way in 
relation to the goods that are exported, imported and consumed locally; all with the effect 
of Africa being squeezed. Its status as a favoured recipient of trade preferences in some 
markets (but not in others) is being eroded rapidly. Increasingly its terms of access to 
non-regional markets will be on the same basis as its competitors’.  
 
Consequently, the attention of trade policy makers has shifted from Brussels to Geneva. 
Yet,  as  the  stalled  Doha  process  attests,  the  multilateral  system  is  still  perceived  as 
insufficiently attuned to Africa’s needs. At the same time the region is being asked by 
some of its traditional trade partners to offer reverse preferences under the guise of free 
trade  agreements  (FTAs).  These  are  being  presented  as  supportive  of  both  regional 
integration and the multilateral system, but it is not certain that the result will help either 
of these. 
 
A corollary of this new-found instability in the region’s global trade relations has been its 
exposure of the frailty – at all levels – of Africa’s capacity to strategise and negotiate. 
The  well-publicised  problems  faced  by  overstretched  (or  non-existent)  diplomatic 
missions in Geneva to cope with the World Trade Organization (WTO) agenda is merely 
the  tip  of  an  iceberg  comprising  multiple  overlapping  trade  negotiations.  As  old 
relationships come under strain and new ones need to be forged, so the demands for a 
clear line of communication from economic stakeholders through line ministries to trade 
negotiators  become  ever  more  marked.  And  the  gap  between  the  ideal  and  reality 
becomes ever more stark. 
 
Despite these disadvantages, African states have been able to engage in a very wide range 
of negotiations, both within and outside Africa. Trade integration within the Southern 
African  Development  Community  (SADC),  the  Common  Market  for  Eastern  and 
Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine 
(UEMOA) is already under way. Africa has played a prominent role in the WTO. And 
negotiations for a successor to the current trade regime with the European Union (EU) are 
under way.  
 
This  paper  reviews  some  of  the  key  issues  related  to  the  impact  of  multilateral  and 
bilateral trade agreements on Africa – and the challenges that lie ahead. It is structured as 
follows. The next section (Section 2) reviews the impact of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the WTO. Section 3 analyzes the impact of trade policies 
of Canada, the EU, Japan and the United States of America (USA). Issues related to 
Economic  Partnership  Agreements  (EPAs)  are  reviewed  in  Section  4,  before  the  last 
section (Section 5) provides some conclusions and challenges.    
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Section 2: Africa in the GATT and WTO 
 
One arena in which Africa has clearly punched above its weight is the Doha Round. The 
Africa  Group  submitted  almost  two-thirds  of  all  the  specific  submissions  to  the 
Committee on Trade and Development (CTD) and over one-third of the proposals on 
systemic cross-cutting issues in the period to July 2002 (WTO, 2002: Annexes 2 and 3). 
African countries also played a prominent role at the Cancún Ministerial, as well as in the 
committee-rich WTO negotiating process.  
 
But, at the same time, the experience emphasised the asymmetry of influence within the 
WTO. Groups with greater numerical than economic and technical strength have more 
power  to  prevent  than  to  mould  in  cases  where  other  members  are  not  actively 
sympathetic. As was demonstrated most prominently at Cancún, they can prevent the 
adoption of proposals to which they object substantially on principle. But, by the same 
token, they cannot force other countries to accept their own proposals. The only way to 
move forward positively within the WTO, therefore, is to mould the technical details of 
proposals as they evolve in order to deal with African concerns – and then only if other 
members are receptive.  
 
One of the problems for the Africa Group is that, despite the statements made in the Doha 
Declaration, some key WTO members have been far from receptive to their perceived 
needs. The unhappy debates around special and differential treatment (SDT) illustrate a 
wider  problem  that  contributed  to  the  collapse  at  Cancún  and  the lack  of  substantial 
progress since then. Resolving these difficulties is a challenge not just for Africa but for 
the entire multilateral system, since the evolution of the WTO as the custodian of trade 
rules that are relevant to the rapidly evolving realities of international commerce may 
depend upon it. 
 
2.1  Special and Differential Treatment in the Doha Round 
 
The  WTO  negotiating  process  is  not  one  that  is  designed  to  throw  up  automatically 
development  friendly  results,  and  nor  does  it  do  so  in  practice.  Negotiations  in  the 
General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade  (GATT)  were  typically  hard-nosed,  with 
negotiators following very narrow, mercantilist agendas. The evidence from Doha so far 
is  that  the  mercantilist  negotiating  ethos  has  not  changed  and  the  commitment  to 
strengthened SDT has not yet been translated into practice (see Box 1). 
 
This has caused concern among many developing countries, not just those in Africa, 
because the sea change from the GATT to the WTO has made ‘formal SDT’ much more 
important.  Scope  for  special  differentiation  applied  extensively  in  the  GATT  and 
benefited  a  very  wide  range  of  members.  This  ‘informal’  SDT  was  achieved  by 
incorporating into the GATT texts vague phrases that could be interpreted in different 
ways by different members. This allowed countries with different views of what should 
be done to sign up to the same set of words, secure in the knowledge that they could 
apply them in their chosen way once the ink was dry. 
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  Box 1: Special and Differential Treatment (SDT): The Doha Promise and Reality 
The Doha Declaration accorded SDT a central place in the current round of rule 
negotiation. It stated that: …provisions for special and differential treatment are an 
integral part of the WTO Agreements … We therefore agree that all special and 
differential treatment provisions shall be reviewed with a view to strengthening them and 
making them more precise, effective and operational. (WTO, 2001). Over 85 proposals 
were submitted at Doha for changes to existing provisions on SDT, but by December 2002 
there was agreement on only five of these. All were of limited scope: one concerned the 
principle of a monitoring mechanism and three were for measures benefiting least 
developed states only (Gillson and Rios, 2003: 11). 
 
 
The innovation of the Uruguay Round to make dispute settlement binding removed this 
escape route. Possibly in consequence the character of the WTO has changed. Policies 
that had been in existence for years have been placed in the WTO’s dispute settlement 
spotlight. And the proportion of cases brought by industrial against developing countries 
has  increased:  a  review  of  cases  brought  between  1995  and  2000  found  a  threefold 
increase compared with the GATT period in the proportion of cases that were brought by 
industrialised countries against developing countries (Delich, 2002: 76). A corollary is 
the vastly more controversial image of the WTO compared with the GATT. 
 
The SDT incorporated into the Uruguay Round texts is unsatisfactory for many members 
and observers. There are two principal problems: large areas of trade policy are without 
any legally enforceable SDT; whilst those existing provisions that are legally enforceable 
are eroding assets. The first is found especially severely in the ‘new areas’ of trade policy 
(such  as  Trade-Related  Aspects  of  Intellectual  Property  Rights  (TRIPs),  services, 
government procurement and competition policy):  no effective SDT exists and it is often 
far from clear what form more robust provisions would take. Enforceable SDT is an 
eroding asset in the sense that it provides modulation of commitments, the vitality of 
which will decline directly (if time limited) and indirectly (if it relates to removal of 
barriers that all members are reducing over time).  
 
These unsatisfactory features of the status quo are evident in each of the three main areas 
of  SDT:  modulation  of  commitments,  trade  preferences  and  declarations  of  support. 
Modulation  of  commitments  is  the  most  substantial  of  the  SDT  provisions.  The 
Agreement on Agriculture, for example, requires the industrialised countries to reduce 
their tariffs by 36 percent over six years, but developing countries have to do so by only 
24 percent over ten years and least developed countries do not need to cut their tariffs at 
all. It normally meets the minimum requirement for effective SDT in that it is ‘legally 
enforceable’:  a  WTO  member  may  use  the  dispensations  granted  under  SDT  in  its 
defence if its trade policies are challenged by another WTO member on the grounds that 
they do not conform with the Uruguay Round commitments. Hence, for example, if India 
were  challenged  on  the  grounds  that  it  had  not  reduced  its  agricultural  tariffs  by  36 
percent, it would have a watertight defence in dispute settlement by pointing to the fact 
that it is required to liberalise by only 24 percent. 
 
The provision of enhanced market access via trade preferences (mainly by industrialised 
countries  to  developing  and  least  developed  countries)  is  justified  under  the  1979   4 
 
 
Enabling  Clause.  This  allows  industrialised  countries  to  discriminate  in  favour  of 
developing countries but it does not require them to do so. There are many areas where 
SDT could be provided on market access, but the industrialised countries do not do so; on 
the contrary, they target their restrictions on developing countries. The misuse of anti 
dumping actions is a case in point. Far from using the provisions that exist within the 
WTO sensitively to reduce the disruption to developing country trade, the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) states are frequently accused of 
claiming that dumping has occurred when it is simply a case that developing countries are 
more competitive than domestic suppliers. As in so many cases, the WTO status quo 
provides the industrialised countries that largely drafted it with substantial opportunities 
for SDT in their own cause, but only limited opportunities in that of the developing 
states! 
 
The extent to which the provisions on trade preferences meet the requirement of legal 
enforceability is questionable and has been clarified by the recent dispute of India against 
the EU (Box 2). The WTO finding in the EU-India dispute opened the possibility that the 
EU could offer substantial preferences to a recognisable group of countries facing similar 
objective  circumstances.  The  EU  responded  with  a  new  Generalised  System  of 
Preferences (GSP) approved in June 2005. The main innovation in the new GSP is a 
special trade regime, to be known as GSP+, that will be available to many developing 
countries (but not all of the poorest) and provide improved access to the EU (but not as 
good as is available to the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP) under Cotonou 
or  to  least  developed  countries  under  ‘Everything  but  Arms’  –  EBA).  A  basic 
requirement  is  for  a  country  to  ratify  and  implement  effectively  16  core  human  and 
labour rights United Nations/International Labour Organization Conventions and at least 
seven (of 11) conventions related to environment and governance principles. In addition, 
countries must satisfy ‘vulnerability’ rules related to the value of their exports. Larger 
countries  and  those  with  a  broader  spread  of  exports  are  more  liable  to  fail  the 
vulnerability test, even though they may be very poor.  
 
  Box 2: India versus the European Union 
The EU’s generalised system of preferences actually offers several different regimes. Some 
beneficiaries are treated more favourably than others. In 2002 India challenged in the WTO 
an element of this intra-GSP differentiation on the grounds that the anti-narcotics regime 
violated GATT Article 1.1 (on non-discrimination).
1 The EU’s primary defence was that 
the discrimination was justified by the Enabling Clause. The Appellate Body found in 
India’s favour in 2004, but included in its decision was a potentially important detail. India 
had argued that in order to claim justification under the Enabling Clause the GSP must 
offer ‘identical’ tariff preferences to all beneficiaries. The Appellate Body rejected this 
argument and asserted the legitimacy of providing different preferences provided that the 
difference responds ‘to a widely-recognized “development, financial [or] trade need”…’ 
(para. 164). The reason it upheld the main substance of the Indian complaint was that the 
EU’s justification for its anti-narcotics regime failed to satisfy this criterion: the 
beneficiaries did not share a widely-recognised trade need that bound them together as 
different from all non-beneficiaries: the provision of specially favourable treatment to 
exports from certain Latin American states. 
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If it avoids WTO challenge, the GSP+ may alter fundamentally the balance of advantage 
and  disadvantage  for  sub-Saharan  Africa  (SSA)  of  economic  partnership  agreements 
(EPAs) with the EU – see below. On the one hand, if uptake of GSP+ is widespread it 
will seriously erode SSA preferences in the EU. On the other, it provides SSA states with 
an alternative to EPAs which, for many states, provides equally good market access for 
current exports. 
 
The third area of SDT, which is wholly unenforceable, comprises the large number of 
declarations of support for developing countries that litter the Uruguay Round texts. For 
example, Article 4 of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) deals with 
encouraging the increased participation of developing countries in international services 
trade through ‘negotiated specific commitments’ relating to the strengthening of their 
domestic  services  capacity,  improvement  of  their  access  to  distribution  channels  and 
liberalisation of market access in sectors and modes of supply of export interest to them. 
Provisions  on  the  needs  of  net  food  importing  developing  countries  are  of  a  similar 
character. There is no action that an aggrieved developing country can take either inside 
or outside the WTO to force another member (or an international organisation) to take 
actions that it believes are consistent with these undertakings.  
 
A considerable element of the discontent expressed by developing countries in the WTO 
about the failures of SDT derives from resentment that they were ‘hoodwinked’ into 
signing  the  Single  Undertaking  of  the  Uruguay  Round  through  promises  that  were, 
literally, not worth the paper they were written on. The Doha negotiations need to resolve 
these problems either by making the SDT provisions enforceable in some sense or by 
amending  current  rules  (or  tailoring  future  rules)  to  take  account  of  their  non-
enforceability. 
 
Existing SDT provisions are not adequate: hence the Doha Declaration commitment to 
strengthen them and make them more operational. But translating this commitment into 
operational practice has so far proved to be beyond the grasp of the WTO members, and 
so there is an impasse. The major problem in dealing with the deficiencies to the status 
quo is not technical but political. To be effective, any development provisions must be 
actionable within the WTO.  
 
It is possible to identify, even at this early stage in the negotiations, flexibilities that 
would address major concerns. But, they must necessarily be couched in quite broad 
terms  given  the  absence  of  specific  texts  for  new  rules.  And  there  is  an  evident 
unwillingness  on  the  part  of  industrialised  countries  to  agree  broad,  enforceable 
provisions at this time. 
 
If there is a problem with broad provisions now, how about more tightly drawn ones at a 
later stage when this becomes feasible because there are draft texts that can be amended? 
The problem here is likely to be the dynamic of the negotiations if the Doha Round 
proceeds  in  the  same  way  as  its  predecessor,  which  is  likely  since  it  appears  to  be 
inherent to the task of negotiating a wide range of complex provisions simultaneously. 
There can be no agreement until the major WTO members have obtained compromises   6 
 
 
with which they can live, and then there is a strong imperative to finalise the deal as 
quickly as possible before this consensus is disturbed.  
The  TRIPs  Agreement  is  a  standing  warning  of  the  danger  that  arises  from  not 
introducing  binding  SDT  at  an  early  stage  of  negotiations  given  that  once  WTO 
agreements have been signed, whatever imperfections are subsequently discovered, 
they are virtually impossible to revise. Its developmental appropriateness has been 
widely questioned not least by the international Commission on Intellectual Property 
Rights (CIPR), established by the then UK Secretary of State for Development, Clare 
Short, with a secretariat staffed mainly by officials drawn from the UK Department 
for  International  Development.  Its  report  casts  doubt  both  on  the  desirability  of 
setting fixed deadlines for the introduction by developing countries of international 
property (IP) laws and on the feasibility of now altering the agreement to remove 
such deadlines (CIPR, 2002:160- 161). 
 
2.2  The Agreement on Agriculture 
 
Africa’s  attitude  towards  multilateral  liberalization  is  necessarily  conditioned  by  the 
anticipated effects that this will have on its preferential trade regime with the EU, its 
main  market. The relative merits of  multilateralism and regionalism have been much 
debated, and there are clearly both pluses and minuses in shifting fundamentally from the 
status quo to a significantly more liberal world trade regime. The relative attractions 
depend  critically  upon  the  time  period  considered  and  the  socio–economic  actors 
involved. But this academic discussion is not necessarily directly relevant to the issues 
that have come before the Doha Round.  
 
The worst-case scenario for Africa is one in which few if any of the identified benefits 
from multilateral liberal trade accrue to the region (because WTO change is too limited) 
but  key  advantages  of  the  current  preferential  regime  are  lost.  There  has  been  little 
progress so far on agreeing detailed changes to the Agreement on Agriculture, but the 
portents  such  as  they  are  cause  concern.  It  is  quite  possible  that  such  a  worst-case 
scenario will be played out. This would be the result of changes in the multilateral arena 
and the preferential one. 
 
Agriculture is the multilateral arena of most interest because the erosion of the key non-
agricultural  preference,  on  clothing,  has  already  happened  (Box  3).  In  the  case  of 
temperate agriculture, however, robust preferences still exist. But they could be eroded 
by any combination of change under the following three headings:  
·  significant  multilateral  liberalisation  to  reduce  OECD  market  access  barriers  to 
agricultural imports; 
·  autonomous actions by OECD states that have the effect of reducing the returns to 
preferential exporters; and 
·  changes to the preferential trade agreements. 
 
The most fundamental change in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture that could alter 
Africa’s preferences would be substantial liberalisation. Preferences are the other side of   7 
 
 
the coin to protectionism. If a country has a liberal trade regime it cannot, by definition, 
offer preferential access to some suppliers. Only if it restricts imports in some significant 
way does the possibility arise of reducing these barriers to some extent for favoured trade 
partners.  
 
  Box 3: Preference Erosion on Clothing 
The decision in the Uruguay Round to phase out the MFA at the end of 2004 means that 
Africa has now lost the most substantial element of its preferential regimes on clothing. 
This is that they were either free from quotas (as with SSA exports to the EU) or that the 
quotas were  much less restrictive than those applied to major competitors (notably the 
countries of Asia). The tariff preferences that remain are relatively minor compared with 
the situation on quotas. There are bound to be significant shifts in the global pattern of 
clothing production as a result. African industries that have depended upon Cotonou, the 
Euro–Med Agreements and the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) for their 
growth will face serious adjustment problems. 
 
 
OECD market access barriers for agriculture fulfil comfortably the requirement of a pre-
existing  restriction:  no  fewer  than  19  of  the  33  Harmonised  System  (HS)  chapters 
covered (in whole or in part) by the Agreement on Agriculture face tariff peaks in at least 
one (and usually two or three) of the Quad states.
1 The evidence so far from Doha is that 
even a successful conclusion to the Round will leave most of these peaks in place.  
 
The existence of peaks is important because it means that apparently substantial tariff 
cuts may still leave in place barriers so high as to keep imports at very low levels. How 
likely is it that the Doha Round will bring down tariff peaks to levels at which substantial 
imports become viable? This is the issue that has proved so far to be one of the stumbling 
blocks to progress. The EU among others failed at the July 2005 WTO ministerial to 
accept a negotiating formula that would remove most very high peaks. 
 
In the absence of substantial liberalisation, will there be big cuts in subsidies? Cotton, the 
African cause célèbre at Cancún, does not feature on the lists of tariff peaks. This is 
because  the  principal  problem  with  the  Agreement  on  Agriculture  for  African  cotton 
producers is not the market access barriers in the Quad but the domestic subsidies of the 
USA. Almost all of West Africa’s cotton exports to the EU in 2002 were ‘cotton, neither 
carded nor combed’ (HS 520100).
2 In the EU, Canada and Japan items in this HS sub-
head face zero percent MFN duties, and although they face a tariff of up to 31.4 cents/kg 
in the USA this is equivalent to only about 10 percent ad valorem.  
 
At Cancún there was prominent discussion of the problems faced by West African cotton 
exporters by US subsidies to American cotton producers, and an Overseas Development 
Institute (ODI) study has argued that EU subsidies may also be damaging to West and 
Central Africa because EU cotton production actively competes in third-country markets 
with  cotton  production  from  developing  countries  (ODI,  2004).  Many  commentators 
attributed  the  perceived  inadequacy  of  the  US  offer  on  cotton  as  a  significant  factor 
                                                 
1 Canada, EU, Japan and the USA. 
2 100 percent of Chad’s, 99 percent of Mali’s, 97 percent of Benin’s and 88 percent of Burkina Faso’s; their 
exports to the USA are so small as not to figure in the United States International Trade Commission data.   8 
 
 
contributing to the stalling of negotiations. The issue had not been resolved at the time of 
writing. 
 
As substantial net importers of cereals, Africa as a region also has an interest in any rule 
changes that would tend to increase import costs and, hence, result in a deterioration in 
their  terms  of  trade.  The  region  has  become  increasingly  dependent  upon  imports. 
Contrary to some popular opinion, this is not primarily a result of food aid, which has 
formed a relatively small (and declining in the last decade covered) share of the total.  
 
A  significant  part  of  the  foreign  exchange  used  to  pay  for  the  imports  comes  from 
agricultural  exports,  which  are  also  affected  by  WTO  rules  (especially  those  on 
preferences).  Hence,  any  change  in  either  side  of  the  trade  equation  could  affect 
indirectly the food security of individuals by altering either the total volume of food 
available in a country or its distribution between different types of food (over which 
individuals have different entitlements). 
 
Section 3: Africa and the Quad 
 
Given the slow progress of Doha at least in the area of agriculture it seems inevitable that 
preferential and regional trade agreements with particular trade partners will continue to 
figure prominently in Africa’s trade profile. But change is under way which could alter 
significantly the gains that the region has traditionally obtained under these agreements. 
 
3.1  The Relative Importance of the Quad 
 
The EU is overwhelmingly Africa’s most important market importing almost 50 percent 
more items than the other three Quad states put together. There are very few items that 
are imported into one of the other three Quad members and not into the EU. In 2000 the 
EU imported 1,710 items from Africa to a value of $1 million or more and of these no 
fewer than 1,692 were covered by a preference for at least one exporter from the region. 
The USA, which was the next largest Quad importer, took only 491 items, of which 
preferences were available for one-half.  
 
The EU has no fewer than eight trade agreements with Africa. All African states are 
eligible for the GSP. Those south of the Sahara (except South Africa) also benefit from 
the  Cotonou  trade  regime
3  and,  in  the  case  of  the  least  developed  countries,  the 
‘Everything but Arms’ (EBA) regime. In addition, South Africa and most of the North 
African countries have their own bilateral agreements. In the case of the North African 
countries, these are of long standing but are in the process of being transformed into 
reciprocal FTAs, many of the provisions of which are similar. This follows the Barcelona 
Declaration objective of creating a Euro–Mediterranean free trade area by 2010.  
 
For Japan and Canada, the GSP is the basic building block of their preferential trade 
regimes with Africa. Both provide special arrangements for least developed countries 
                                                 
3 South Africa is formally a party to the Cotonou Agreement, but is not eligible for the trade regime.   9 
 
 
within the GSP framework which offer wider and deeper preferences. In the case of the 
USA,  the  GSP  is  also  the  building  block,  but  AGOA  provides  the  most  favourable 
treatment within the GSP framework for 125 of the 491 items (26 percent) for which data 
are available for the USA’s imports from Africa.  
 
At the same time a higher proportion of imported products face zero MFN tariffs in 
countries other than the EU. The proportion ranges from almost two-thirds for Canada to 
just over a half for Japan and 42 percent for USA; in the EU it is just over one-quarter 
(although in absolute terms the EU offers a zero MFN on more items than all the other 
three combined).  
 
The two sets of figures are related. One reason why Canada cannot offer preferences on a 
large proportion of its imports from Africa is that it levies a zero MFN duty on many. As 
indicated  above,  preferences  are the  obverse  of  protectionism.  This  is  the  underlying 
reason  why  liberal-trade  economists  will  normally  prefer  multilateral  liberalisation  to 
preferences.  Additionally,  there  is  the  political  assessment  that  the  vested  interests 
created by preferences may prove to be a ‘stumbling block’ rather than a ‘building block’ 
to multilateralism, to adapt Bhagwati’s celebrated aphorism. But in cases such as the 
present, where multilateral liberalisation is not on offer (because there is no consensus in 
the WTO), regionalism may be a second-best. 
 
3.2  The Protection–Preference Nexus 
 
Central to the argument on how Africa may be affected by change to its regional 
agreements is the concept of ‘trade policy rents’ (Box 4). An important paradox emerges: 
that Africa’s greatest gains from exporting to Europe have been in the products that 
appear at first glance to be the most heavily protected and to receive the least generous 
preferences.  
 
  Box 4: How Rents are Created 
What are termed ‘trade policy rents’ arise when a market is distorted but certain suppliers 
of imports receive preferential access. The purpose of the distortion is to enable domestic 
producers to sell goods that consumers would otherwise prefer to buy from foreign 
producers (whether because they are cheaper, of a preferred quality or whatever).  
One way to do this is to subsidise the domestic producers – but this tends to be politically 
unpopular because it is visible, and results either in higher taxes or lower government 
expenditure on other things. Another, less visible and less politically costly way is to rig the 
domestic market so that consumers have to pay the higher prices at which domestic 
producers can compete.  
One of the fundamental mechanisms to achieve this is to impose protectionist trade barriers 
that, by squeezing imports, restrict supply and maintain prices at higher levels than would 
otherwise apply. In some cases, these restrictions (and their price effects) are substantial. 
The principal intention of these distortions is normally to confer the rents on producers in 
the distorting state, but there is leakage – often through preferences. All of the OECD 
countries offer some form of preferential market access to certain developing countries. 
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Africa’s exports fall into three groups in terms of their market characteristics. These are:  
1.  traditional  products  (such  as  beverages)  that  are  exported  to  a  relatively 
undifferentiated, liberal world market; 
2.  other traditional exports (such as clothing, beef, sugar, citrus and olive oil) that are 
exported to markets that are heavily influenced by agricultural protectionism; and 
3.  non-traditional  products  (such  as  horticulture)  that  are  exported  to  markets 
characterised to a greater or lesser extent by protectionism. 
The reason for differentiating between these groups is that they face very different ‘value 
chains’ and price characteristics. The secular decline in the terms of trade for the first 
category (beverages, etc.) was forecast over half a century ago in the pioneering work of 
Raúl Prebisch and Hans Singer; forecasts that have been borne out in reality. African 
exporters are price-takers on a declining world market. Some appear to have ‘lost’ their 
comparative advantage to new entrants such as Malaysia (as in the case of West African 
palm oil production). 
 
The second category would have been expected, on the basis of the Prebisch–Singer 
analysis, to have suffered a secular decline in their terms of trade, were it not for the fact 
that OECD governments (and especially the EU) have stepped in with policies to support 
the prices received by their own farmers and have passed on some of these ‘benefits’ to 
some African exporters. Consequently, the relative returns from exporting these products 
have  been  much  more  attractive  than  for  other  traditional  commodities  (Stevens  and 
Kennan, 2001: Figure 7.8). 
 
The third category (non-traditional exports) shares the same characteristic – but the scale 
of the price boost is less marked than for some category 2 items (such as sugar and beef) 
and the structure of the value chain through which the final price is distributed is very 
different. In broad terms, Africa’s gains from the non-traditional exports have been less 
substantial than those from the protected traditionals, but the gains are less vulnerable to 
policy change in the EU. 
 
In general terms, the protection–preference nexus makes sourcing imports from some 
suppliers more attractive than from others, but who gains what depends upon the power 
distribution within a value chain. It may accrue to any combination of the producers, 
processors or shippers in the preferred countries, or the buyers in the importing country.  
 
The  balance  between  them  is  affected  by  both  the  overall  scale  of  the  rent  and  the 
architecture of the rules that create it. Rents are most substantial in product markets (such 
as beef and rice) that face protectionism so severe that it restricts sharply the possibility 
of importing from non-preferred sources. At the other end of the scale are items for which 
protection is so modest as to render any preferences of limited commercial value. In the 
middle are commodity groups like horticulture where EU tariffs are moderately high but 
the  advantage  of  a  preference  is  available  to  a  large  number  of  countries  (Dolan, 
Humphrey and Harris-Pascal, 1999). 




3.3  The Effect of the Agreement Architecture 
 
For  the recipient the  existence  of  a  preference is  better  ceteris  paribus  than  its  non-
existence, and a deep cut in protection is better than a shallow cut, but the matter does not 
end here. There are features of a preference agreement that can enhance or retard its 
development  impact  in  addition  to  the  simple  matters  of  breadth  (number  of  items 
covered) and depth (reduction in protection). And these can change. 
 
Who gains this rent within the value chain depends upon the bargaining power of the 
various elements – retailers, importers, shippers, exporters or producers – which depends 
in turn partly upon their inherent characteristics and partly upon the architecture of the 
preference agreement. There exists a host of ways in which the rules and procedures of a 
preference agreement can bias the result in favour of one party or another.  
 
For  example,  if  (as  is  normally  the  case)  it  is  importers  who  are  legally  liable  for 
penalties for tax evasion should a good be shown ex post not to have been eligible for a 
preference,  then  the  preferential  tariff  may  not  even  be  claimed.  A  review  of  EU 
importers indicates that this is a very real concern (Cerrex, 2002). In such cases, the 
potential tax cut will not translate into any actual tax cut at all.  
 
A change in agreement architecture can affect the distribution of gains. A comparison 
between sugar exported under the EU–ACP Sugar Protocol and under EBA illustrates 
how the effect of the protection–preference nexus on any given group of producers or 
countries will depend on many features of the regime’s architecture. Under the EU’s 
EBA  initiative  it  has  since  March  2001  imported  duty  free  from  all  least  developed 
countries any product except arms or bananas sugar and rice for which implementation 
has been partially deferred until 2006 for bananas and 2009 for the others. During this 
transition period the tariff is being reduced progressively and there are duty-free quotas 
for sugar and rice that are set at levels comfortably above past flows. 
 
Under the EU-ACP Sugar Protocol each beneficiary has a fixed quota and is guaranteed a 
price  related  to  those  in  Europe.  When  EBA  is  fully  implemented  there  will  be  no 
quantitative limits on the sugar that least developed African countries are able to export, 
but neither is there any built-in protection on price. For this reason, the least developed 
sugar-exporting  countries  have  so  far  agreed  to  what  is  effectively  a  market-sharing 
agreement with the non-least developed ACP Sugar Protocol beneficiaries. Whether or 
not  this  arrangement  will  survive  full  EBA  liberalisation  of  sugar  in  2009  and  the 
proposed EU price cuts remains to be seen! 
 
3.4  Europe’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
 
Relief  (full  or  partial)  from  the  CAP’s  protectionism  is  currently  one  of  the  most 
commercially valuable African trade preferences, and its relative importance will grow as 
other  preferences  are  eroded.  But  autonomous  change  to  the  CAP  may  erode  these 




It is important not to confuse ‘CAP change’ with ‘liberalisation’ which, in the normal 
sense,  means  changing  the  government  rules,  taxes  and  subsidies  that  stop  high-cost 
domestic producers losing market share to lower-cost imports. It implies that the global 
location of production will change over time, with lower-cost producers increasing output 
and higher-cost producers declining. CAP change, by contrast, aims to sustain European 
production  but  to  reshuffle  the  subsidies  and  taxes  to  make  them  less  costly  to  the 
European budget and more easily defensible in the WTO. They will have very limited 
effects on the EU’s overall agricultural trade since they will neither decrease production 
below  domestic  consumption  nor  increase  market  access.  But  they  could  erode 
developing country preferences. 
 
The key to CAP reform as set out in the EU’s Agenda 2000 reforms and its mid-2002 
proposals on the preference for beef and rice (EC, 2002) is to let market prices fall but to 
offset this for European farmers through income supports. The most substantial change 
for Africa will be felt in the sugar sector especially following the new EU proposals for 
its regime following an adverse verdict of the WTO Appellate Body in April 2005. The 
complaint, brought by Australia, Brazil and Thailand, was that Europe’s subsidised sugar 
exports exceeded its Uruguay Round limits. To reduce exports the EU proposes to cut the 
price for sugar (to which SSA exports are linked) by 39% in two annual instalments 
(beginning 2006/7) to €319.5 per ton. The impact of these cuts on European farmers will 
be substantially offset: each EU member state will have funding equivalent to 60% of the 
estimated revenue loss that its sugar industry will suffer as a result of the price cuts in 
order to assist producers to leave and to offset the effects on those that remain.  
 
But SSA exporters will receive no such compensation; their producers will feel the full 
force of the cuts. In 2003 the Commission calculated that the severe effects that would 
follow from  a slightly larger price cut (in two stages to €290 per tonne). It forecast that 
exports to the EU would cease after the first instalment from the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, and Madagascar (plus Jamaica); after the second only Zimbabwe, Zambia, 
Sudan, Ethiopia and Mozambique would continue exporting to the EU, and the amounts 
supplied would be relatively small at around 0.2 million tonnes (EC, 2003). Under the 
new proposal the 2009/10 the price for raw sugar will be, higher than in the estimate but 
not by much.  
 
A related point is that the process of reform could progressively relax the constraints on 
EU  exports  of  sugar-based  value-added  foodstuffs  imposed  as  a  result  of  WTO 
disciplines on export refunds for these products (CTA, 2004). This could result in an 
expansion in exports of simple value-added foods to developing countries that are non-
subsidised in WTO terms but nonetheless have benefited from direct farm payments.  
 
Section 4: Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) 
 
The basic arguments over the pros and cons of EPAs date back to 1997 (Box 5) and 
‘negotiations’ have been underway since 2002. Regional talks have formally commenced 
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Africa, and ‘SADC minus’. But, at the time of writing, none had reached the stage of 
detailed proposals. 
 
  Box 5: The Origins of EPAs 
The European Commission’s arguments for and against a change to the EU–ACP trade 
regime were set out in a Green Paper to which the ACP (and also civil society and research 
organisations) subsequently responded (EC, 1997). They included the points that a new 
regime should do more to foster the integration of ACP states into the world economy and 
should be more easily defensible in the WTO. It was not possible to agree such a new 
regime from the outset of the Cotonou Agreement. Instead Cotonou extends the Lomé trade 
regime, but with the proviso that negotiations must commence this year for a successor 
regime that will come into effect in 2007. It is the scope of this post-2007 trade agreement 
that is the subject of the negotiations that began formally in September 2002. 
 
 
4.1  The WTO Rules on Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) 
 
A key element of the EU case is that EPAs are more supportive of the multilateral trade 
system  than  is  the  non-reciprocal  Cotonou  Agreement,  and  that they can  be justified 
under Article XXIV. This is the WTO provision that allows members to discriminate in 
favour of some trade partners (and, hence, against others) provided that they are creating 
a customs union or free trade agreement (FTA). Because they would involve reciprocal 
tariff cuts, the EU claims that EPAs would pass the Article XXIV test. 
 
But what, exactly, are the requirements of Article XXIV? The formal requirements for an 
agreement to be treated as an FTA are fairly straightforward, but practice is not so clear-
cut. This is because Article XXIV is vague — by design rather than by accident, because 
members have been unwilling to restrict themselves through a more precise formulation. 
One salient requirement of Article XXIV is that the FTA must be completed ‘within a 
reasonable length of time’ (defined in the WTO as a period that ‘should exceed ten years 
only in exceptional cases’). Another is that ‘duties and other restrictive regulations of 
commerce  ...  are  eliminated  on  substantially  all  the  trade  between  the  constituent 
territories’ (GATT, 1947: Part 3, Article XXIV, paragraphs 5(c) and 8(b); WTO, 1995: 
32).  
 
There  is  a  similar  difference  between  the  formal  requirement  for  legitimising  any 
proposed regime (clear cut) and practice (murky). The formal hurdle for approving an 
agreement as in conformity with Article XXIV is high. The agreement must have the 
universal support of members because of the WTO practice of requiring a consensus for 
all decisions. But in the past a failure to achieve a consensus has not proved to be a 
barrier to those countries wishing to create an FTA. 
 
The first step is for the parties to the agreement to notify the WTO following signature of 
an  FTA.  Such  notification  will  be  followed  by  the  referral  of  the  FTA  to  the  WTO 
Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA) for consideration. Membership of the 
CRTA is open to any country that feels it to be in its interests to belong. In theory the 
CRTA will produce a report on the compliance, or otherwise, of the FTA with Article   14 
 
 
XXIV for adoption by consensus of the WTO membership. But practice is a lot less 
clear-cut (Box 6). 
 
  Box 6: The work of the CRTA 
The CRTA has a large backlog of work and, since it operates by consensus, has reached 
very  few  ‘decisions’  on  whether  or  not  agreements  conform.  Of  the  25  regional  trade 
agreements that had been notified to GATT/WTO and were still in force at 5 May 2003:  
·  for six the CRTA’s factual examination had not started; 
·  14 were in the factual examination stage; 
·  in two cases the factual examination had been concluded; and 
in three cases there were on-going consultations on the draft report. 
 
 
There is no reason to expect a change in practice anytime soon. The CRTA’s backlog of 
agreements is growing. On past form, it is unlikely to give a straightforward approval or 
disapproval of any agreement – not least because of the need for consensus. Parties to an 
agreement  are  unlikely  to  acquiesce  in  an  unfavourable  verdict,  but  those  who  face 
discrimination (or would do so in an analogous agreement between other countries) will 
not wish to see the precedent of a favourable report.  
 
But this does not mean that countries can sign up to anything and just call it an FTA. In 
the absence of clear guidance from the Committee, it would still be open to any aggrieved 
WTO member to file a complaint under the dispute settlement mechanism. This could 
pass to a quasi-judicial body the task of defining such terms as ‘substantially all’ trade. In 
other words, approval or disapproval of an EPA is likely to happen by default. Unless a 
WTO member challenges it on the grounds that it does not comply with Article XXIV, 
WTO compatibility will never be tested. 
 
It follows that the EU’s insistence on the need for WTO conformity as a raison d’être for 
EPAs could come back to haunt it. The WTO conformity, or otherwise, of the EPA 
approach (and its operation and interpretation of the Article XXIV requirements – see 
below) could be determined in the coming years through a dispute. It might be a dispute 
over  an  existing  agreement  (such  as  the  Trade,  Development  and  Co-operation 
Agreement (TDCA) with South Africa), or over an EPA following its introduction, or 
even over an agreement that does not involve the EU and Africa at all. But whatever the 
proximate cause of a dispute that defines the meaning of terms in Article XXIV, it would 
henceforth apply to all. 
 
4.2  Reciprocity  
 
Most of the discussion on the successor to the Cotonou trade regime has focused so far on 
the perceived costs to the ACP arising from reciprocity in the proposed new EPAs. Under 
Lomé and Cotonou the ACP were required merely to treat the EU no less favourably than 
any other industrialised trade partner. In complete contrast, the new EPAs will offer duty-
free access for ‘substantially all’ EU exports to the ACP.  
 
There are two reasons why the reciprocity debate has taken centre stage, to the virtual 
exclusion so far of the other vital issues. They are that:    15 
 
 
·  the ACP liberalisation required for reciprocity is bound to have adjustment and 
fiscal costs for these states in the form of increased competition for domestic 
producers and lower trade taxes for governments; 
·  there is not much else to debate since neither the EU nor the ACP have been able 
so far to put forward in any detail other specific innovations for an EPA. 
As  with  CAP  change  (noted  above)  it  is  very  important  not  to  fall  into  the  trap  of 
equating automatically a new policy like EPAs with ‘trade liberalisation’ as it is normally 
understood in economic textbooks. EPAs will result in textbook change only if the price 
of imports into ACP members falls and this reduction is passed on to users (who need not 
be  the  final  consumers).  If  an  imported  good  that  competes  with  a  domestic  good 
becomes cheaper to the consumer, they will switch purchases; if it becomes cheaper to 
the retailer/wholesaler then they are more likely to stock it. In either case, imports of the 
good increase and domestic production goes down. 
 
There are at least four reasons why EPAs alone might not produce this effect:   
1.  if there is no cut in tariff rates; 
2.  if the exporter appropriates the tariff cut by charging a higher price; 
3.  if the importer appropriates the tariff cut and on-sells at the same price; and 
4.  if EPAs are overtaken by other trade liberalisation. 
 
The first point arises because EPAs will not liberalise all trade, only ‘substantially all’. 
Some goods will not need to be subject to any tariff reduction. Points 2–4 are interlinked. 
Tariff  cuts  towards  one  trade  partner  will  not  necessarily  result  in  any  price  falls. 
Competitive markets need to be created – they don’t necessarily ‘just happen’. Take the 
case of a piece of industrial equipment that can be imported from either the EU or, say, 
Japan for the same price, and which faces a 25 percent tariff. If the tariff is cut to zero 
percent under the EPA, the EU exporters could try to gain market share from Japan. But 
they might also prefer to increase their prices by 25 percent, which would have no effect 
on the price paid by the customer or on the volume of sales, but would result in greater 
profits. They are more likely to choose the second option if the chance of increasing sales 
volume is small (perhaps because Japan could cut prices too). The same arithmetic will 
be done by importers. If domestic trade is not competitive they need not pass on any price 
cut. A tariff cut is more likely to result in a fall in domestic prices if it applies to many 
potential sources of imports, and/or if there is a competitive domestic market. 
 
The  more  general  the  liberalisation  the  harder  it  becomes  to  sustain  the  restrictive 
business practices that allow exporters or importers to make enhanced profits (at the 
expense of government revenue). Multilateral liberalisation through the WTO would be 
the most general – and the most likely to result in both the gains and the adjustment costs 
associated with market opening. A regional agreement with only the EU would be much 
narrower. A set of regional agreements (with other African and non-African states) would 
fall in between these two extremes. So the ultimate impact of an EPA is likely to be 
affected heavily by Africa’s negotiations with trade partners other than the EU. 
 
Whilst it is not yet possible to provide a definitive assessment of ‘benefits’ or ‘costs’ of 
EPAs (let alone an economic analysis of their effect on Africa’s economies), there is a   16 
 
 
clear and urgent need for a set of ‘what if’ analyses. These would identify the potential 
product exemptions from EPAs of different memberships. 
 
In case a challenge is made, it is important that the requirements of Article XXIV be 
taken seriously in structuring any EPAs. But, of course, these requirements could change 
either in the Doha Round or as a result of dispute settlement. The ACP Guidelines state 
that  the  ACP  should  champion  such  change  by  preparing  and  submitting  concrete 
proposals within Doha (ACP Group, 2002: para. 16). 
  
At present it is difficult to be sure what all this means for the structure of EPAs but some 
guidance is available from the EU–South Africa TDCA. This not only makes clear what 
the EU interprets Article XXIV to require, but it is also possible that, between now and 
2007,  it  could  be  subject  to  a  WTO  challenge  and  so  provide  a  test  case  for  the 
interpretation of Article XXIV (Box 7). 
 
  Box 7: The Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement (TDCA) and Article 
XXIV 
In the TDCA the EU has stated that it believes the Article XXIV requirement that an FTA 
must cover ‘substantially all’ trade can be fulfilled if both parties reduce to zero tariffs on 
products that account for 90 percent on average of the current trade between them. It has 
also indicated that it believes this average figure can be achieved asymmetrically, with the 
EU liberalising on more than 90 percent and its partner on less. In the specific case of the 
EU–South  Africa  TDCA,  South  Africa  has  liberalised  on  products  accounting  for  86 
percent  of  its  imports  from  the  EU  while  Europe  has  liberalised  on  94  percent.  The 
agreement  also  indicates  that  the  EU  believes  the  Article  XXIV  requirement  that 
liberalisation  occur  ‘within  a  reasonable  period  of  time’  can  be  achieved  through  a 
transitional period of up to 12 years. 
 
 
4.3  Africa’s Offensive Interests 
 
Although ACP interests have been heavily focused on the implications of reciprocity, the 
negotiations need to address several other very important issues. These all centre on the 
fact that the existing trade regime is eroding fast and needs to be revived. Since the EU’s 
mandate  contains  no  specific  proposals  for  improving  its  import  regime,  and  merely 
offers to respond to ACP requests in certain areas, it is important that the ACP take the 
initiative to articulate their demands. This will require research. 
 
The ACP Guidelines specifically refer to the need to assess the impact of CAP reform. In 
addition, the ACP’s demands for treatment of its agricultural exports under EPAs need to 
take account of (and seek to influence) the EU’s positions in the WTO. It seems very 
likely that the current negotiations on the Agreement on Agriculture will not result in a 
substantially  liberal  EU  import  regime  for  products  covered  by  the CAP.  Hence,  the 
possibility  will  continue  to  exist  for  significant  ACP  preferences.  The  task  for  the 
negotiations will be to ensure that this potential is realised. 
 
Given that the EU has proposed, in its mandate, to remove all quantitative restrictions, a 
high priority for initial research is on those products currently subject to tariff-rate quotas   17 
 
 
(TRQs). These include sugar, beef and rice. An early study should be to identify the 
implications for ACP exporters of the removal of any quantitative restrictions on their 
exports to the EU in order to help articulate a negotiating position that serves all ACP 
interests. 
 
The two key changes needed on goods cover market access on agriculture and rules of 
origin. A proposal was made in the initial draft Commission mandate to extend EBA 
coverage to all ACP states but dropped following intra-Commission wrangling. It needs 
to be revived (and included in the Euro–Med Agreements with North Africa). Not only 
would it represent the removal of all existing barriers to African exports, but it would 
defuse the incipient tension within African regional agreements between least developed 
countries and the others. 
 
On the rules of origin, the experience with AGOA and its liberal rules on the use of 
imported  inputs  to  clothing  for  the  lesser-developed  countries  provides  convincing 
evidence that the Cotonou rules are unrealistic. There is a need for more liberal rules on 
cumulation and the reduction in the level of processing required. 
 
4.4  An Economic Partnership Agreement on Services 
 
Perhaps the most intriguing area for Africa is the proposal that EPAs include a services 
component. SSA must decide whether to embrace this enthusiastically as an opportunity 
to  obtain  better  conditions  for  its  services  exports,  or  defensively  as  a  challenge  to 
domestic providers. But in either case all states will need to understand better what might 
be involved. International trade in services is riven with barriers. Whereas barriers to 
international trade in goods have fallen substantially over the past 50 years, services trade 
is still subject to a wide range of laws and other regulations. The barriers that these create 
are often complex, indirect and opaque – and may be quite invisible until someone tries 
to export. 
 
4.4.a  Precedents 
There are a few precedents on what might be in a services accord, but they point in 
different  directions.  For  example,  in  the  EU–South  Africa  TDCA  the  provisions  are 
largely of a formal kind. They introduce the possibility of negotiations taking place on 
services but include no specific provisions. Similarly, while they allude to the need to 
make any provisions compatible with WTO requirements, they only talk about the need 
to offer substantial liberalisation.  
 
The  EC–Bulgaria  Agreement
4  provides  universal  sectoral  coverage  for  services  but 
establishes that this will be ‘gradual’ in the case of some activities. But the accord may 
not be a true precedent as it is a European Association Agreement. Bulgaria has adopted a 
transitional period arrangement of ten years maximum, divided into two five-year stages.  
 
The EU–Mexico Agreement follows the South African precedent of an initial accord that 
provides only a broad framework establishing that the two parties would endeavour to 
                                                 
4 WT/REG1/S/C/N55 currently under factual examination.   18 
 
 
negotiate  a  services  agreement,  but  it  has  gone  further  in  subsequently  filling  in  the 
details.
5  This  task  was  passed  to  the  EU-Mexico  Joint  Council  established  under  the 
agreement. The Council decided on 27 February 2001 an initial set of provisions in the 
area of services.
6 There are two important features to note about this 2001 decision. The 
first is that it is very restricted in terms of specific coverage. But the second is that it sets 
a  timetable  for  adding  further  detail.  Since  the  timetable  expires  well  before  the 
conclusion of the EPA negotiations, Africa needs to monitor subsequent agreements to 
determine more clearly the extent to which the EU is willing to liberalise.  
 
The EU–Chile Association Agreement of 26 April 2002 goes much further than either the 
initial or the revised Mexico accord. It provides extensive schedules, similar in format to 
GATS ones, detailing the treatment that each side will accord to the other. The schedules, 
which run to many pages of very tightly worded text, give the impression that they bear 
very close similarity to the EU’s position in the GATS. 
 
4.4.b  What might be in a services EPA? 
In the absence of any clear precedent one can only speculate on what might – or should 
be – in any services EPA. To be useful it would need to remove barriers to trade that 
would  not  otherwise  be  lifted  and  where  removal  is  desirable  from  a  development 
perspective. Both the barriers and the effects of their removal are unclear. 
 
Behind-the-border measures are of the essence to the restriction of services trade. Indeed, 
it may not be the service that crosses a border at all. It may be the customer who crosses 
the  border  (as  with  tourism)  or  the  supplier  (on-site  auditing  or  computer  services). 
Moreover, the impact of any regulation on the commercial viability of trade will depend 
on the specifics of the services activity. Immigration and visa problems may be merely 
tiresome for one firm (that does most business over the web or phone) but ruinous for 
another (for which frequent close contact with the client is essential). 
 
Whether or not a regulation is constraining may depend on the way a service is delivered. 
For example, if an airline wishes to sell paper tickets it may be advantageous to set up a 
travel shop in its market. This will require it to conform to all the host government’s 
requirements for setting up, staffing and marketing a business, and will probably require 
the movement of people across borders and, hence, immigration controls. If, by contrast, 
electronic tickets are sold over the web none of this need necessarily be required; instead 
there may be other regulations.  
 
Insurance, too, can be sold either through a shop or over the web. Governments may have 
prudential  regulations  applying  to  the  validity  in  their  domestic  market  of  policies 
purchased from a non-resident supplier over the web. Selling over the web may not be a 
problem, but no one will buy the policies because they are not valid in the export market 
due to government rules.  
 
                                                 
5 Official Journal of the European Communities, L276, 28 October 2000 (pp 45–61). 
6 Official Journal of the European Communities, L70, 12 March 2001 (pp 7–50).   19 
 
 
Given the heterogeneity of services trade (and trade restrictions) it is vital to specify 
precisely  what  is  to  be  traded  and  how.  Only  then  can  the  most  constraining  trade 
restrictions be identified. An increase in exports of goods will affect directly how many 
imports can be obtained: the wages paid to those who produce the goods will increase 
domestic purchasing power and the foreign exchange received by the local exporting firm 
will finance imports.  
 
Services  exports  under  Modes  1  and  2  (cross-border  and  consumption  abroad)  have 
similar  effects.  Work  is  undertaken  in  the  exporting  state  and  the  foreign  exchange 
accrues to local firms (even though, as with goods, a part may also be held abroad by 
them or accrue to foreign associates).  
 
But  the  situation  with Modes  3  and  4  (establishment  abroad  and  presence  of  natural 
persons) is different. The extreme case is provided by the individual migrant worker: s/he 
works, consumes and saves abroad; unless and until a part of their savings is repatriated 
(and/or  the  person  returns  with  new  skills),  there  is  no  direct  economic  gain  to  the 
‘exporting country’; rather, there is a loss of human resources. The contrast is less stark 
with Modes 3 and 4 undertaken by employees of home-based companies, but the direct 
economic gains for the home state will still be smaller than for goods.  
 
The primary gains to the exporting country under Modes 3 and 4 are indirect. If an 
African  firm  sets  up  an  office  in  UK  employing  mainly  British  individuals  it  will 
contribute little directly to employment in its home country or, except to the extent it 
repatriates its profits, to foreign exchange receipts. But it may contribute indirectly – for 
example by increasing ‘follow-on’ orders for goods and services produced in its home 
country, by enhancing the skills of citizens who are employed abroad, or by making the 
firm (including its domestic operations) more globally competitive. 
 
The  important  negotiating  point  is  that  Modes  3  and  4  are  often  a  means  to  an  end 
(increased exports of goods and of services under Modes 1 and 2) rather than a national 
economic  objective  in  their  own  right.  This  may  affect  a  government’s  negotiating 
strategy and lead to a paradox. Restrictions on Modes 3 and 4 exports may be more 
obvious and severe than those on Modes 1 and 2. Hence there is ‘more to negotiate 
about’.  Yet  the  national  gains  from  reducing  Mode  3  and  4  restrictions  may  be  less 
obvious. 
 
Section 5: Conclusions and Challenges 
 
The  world  of  trade  policy  is  changing  fast  in  ways  that  affect  profoundly  Africa’s 
competitive position. One task is to assess which changes are inevitable and begin the 
process of adjustment – which may be substantial and require change over a long period 
in  many  economic  and  institutional  areas.  Another  is  to  influence  the  policy  debate 
wherever possible in order to channel change along less destructive routes. This Working 
Paper has concentrated on providing evidence of the changes and suggestions for the 
second task, but this is not intended to reduce the urgency and necessity of the first. 
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One  important  conclusion  is  that  Africa  should  challenge  the  economic  justifications 
given by proponents of the most damaging changes. These are often justified on the 
grounds that they are a step towards liberalisation which will, over time, enhance global 
welfare, and that Africa needs to ‘stop living in the past and accept change’. In fact, 
neither CAP reform nor EPAs are clear exercises in liberalisation: they will certainly 
produce adjustment costs for Africa but there is little reason to expect, on the basis of 
what is known now, that they will result directly in any global welfare gains.  
 
Nor it is true, as the proponents of such changes like to claim, that ‘trade preferences 
have had their day’. What is true is that many existing preferences are eroding fast. But 
plenty of scope exists to replace them  with new preferences because one of the two 
objective requirements exists: there are areas of goods and services trade in which the 
OECD states are still heavily protectionist. What appears to be missing is the second 
requirement: a political willingness on the part of some OECD states to offer more liberal 
access to Africa in these areas. Even for LDCs apparently liberal access like EBA is 
hedged with restrictive rules of origin. 
 
So  it  is  possible  for  Africa  to  make  its  case  forcefully  without  appearing  to  reject 
consensus views on the desirability of a liberal world trade regime. This is a banner under 
which it can continue to play an active role in the evolution of international trade policy. 
But it faces two sets of challenges.  
 
The first challenge is well understood – the problem is in dealing with it. It is that such 
negotiations place huge demands on a society. It is often remarked that the negotiating 
teams of the larger OECD countries are huge compared with those of African states. But 
it is worth remembering that the disparity in size also reflects a difference in composition. 
The OECD delegations include representatives of producer and consumer interests. It is 
their task to identify the commercial implications of proposed rules and, in turn, to make 
drafting suggestions for the rules which would have commercial implications that they 
favour. And the whole delegation operates within an environment in which civil society 
organisations  assess  and  lobby  in  order  to  produce  country  positions  that  reflect  the 
interests of socio–economic groups other than producers. 
 
To this extent the oft-cited problem that many African delegations in Geneva (let alone 
Brussels, Washington and Tokyo) are understaffed slightly misses the point. Or, rather, it 
is  merely  the  tip  of  the  iceberg.  Of  even  greater  importance  is  the  absence  of  an 
integrated mechanism that links trade negotiators with producer and consumer groups 
within a country that can identify society’s offensive and defensive interests in any set of 
negotiations. Without this, the Geneva delegations, however well staffed, are operating in 
something of a vacuum. 
 
The second challenge is less frequently recognised. It is that the market always has a 
tendency  to  outpace  the  regulators,  and  this  disparity  may  well  be  widening  with 
globalisation. Hence, a failure to agree changes to rules does not necessarily mean that 
the status quo will remain in force. What it may well mean is that the existing rulebook 
becomes increasingly obsolete as it fails to address new methods and types of trade and   21 
 
 
an increasingly free hand is given de facto if not de jure to the market. A related problem 
is that the impasse in the multilateral system, whatever its cause, may result in like-
minded countries developing their own sub-multilateral rules. Whilst these would not 
apply de jure to non-partners, there is the danger than they will apply de facto. Africa 
already experiences the impact of wholly informal rule-making on agricultural standards 
imposed by European supermarkets, against which there is no appeal. The task is to bring 
these under some degree of public control – and to avoid the extent of private rule-
making spiralling. 
 
Africa’s task is to avoid the twin challenges of inappropriate new public rules (whether 
multilateral or regional) and the danger that, in the absence of public regulation, the 
private  sector  determines  the  rules  of  the  game.  In  recent  years  its  negotiators  have 
demonstrated  to  the  rest  of  the  world  that  the  region  cannot  be  taken  for  granted  in 
international trade negotiations. The task for the future is to develop capacity to develop 
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